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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRYAN ALLEN PERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20050323-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. This Court has pour-over jurisdiction pursuant 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Has defendant shown that the trial court committed plain error in 
denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without 
holding an evidentiary hearing or appointing new counsel where 
nothing in the record suggests that a more favorable result was 
reasonably likely had the trial court taken that action? 
Because defendant did not preserve these claims below, this Court may consider 
them only for plain error. To establish plain error, defendant must show that 6"(i) [a]n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error 
was harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the [defendant]."5 State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). 
II. Has defendant shown that his trial counsel was ineffective in not 
requesting an evidentiary hearing or new counsel after defendant filed 
of a pro se motion to withdraw his plea alleging ineffective assistance 
where defendant has not identified anything new counsel would have 
done differently? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. See State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004) provides that a guilty plea "may be 
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made." 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony, and one count of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a second 
degree felony (Rl-2). On January 27, 2005, defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated 
robbery in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the firearm charge and to not 
refer defendant to the federal government for a firearms prosecution (R23, 26-30). 
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Before sentencing, defendant sent a letter to the trial court stating that he wished to 
withdraw his plea because his counsel had provided ineffective assistance (R32). 
Defendant's trial counsel subsequently filed a formal motion to withdraw but never filed 
a memorandum supporting that motion (R33-34). The State opposed defendant's motion 
(R35-40). On March 17, 2005, the trial court invited argument on the motion (R43-44; 
R59:2). When both counsel declined argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion 
and sentenced him to five-years-to-life in state prison (R43-44; R59:2). 
Defendant timely appealed (R46-47). The supreme court transferred the matter to 
this Court for disposition (R55). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On October 13, 2004, defendant asked a man, Travis Mendoza, for a ride to the 
mouth of Ogden Canyon (R60:6,3-4). Defendant told Mr. Mendoza that he was looking 
for a lost ring (R60:6). 
When the two men arrived at the mouth of the canyon, they began looking for the 
ring and wandered some distance away from the road searching for it. Suddenly, 
defendant "pulled out a gun and demanded the victim's valuables." Mr. Mendoza gave 
defendant his car keys, his wallet, and other miscellaneous property (R60:6). 
Fearing that he might be killed, Mr. Mendoza then reached for defendant's gun. 
After a brief struggle, Mr. Mendoza was shot in the arm. Defendant ran from the scene, 
1
 Because no preliminary hearing was held on this matter, the facts are taken from 
defendant's Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and from the plea hearing. 
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took Mr. Mendoza's car, and sped off. A short while later, officers located defendant. 
Defendant led the officers on a brief car chase. When defendant crashed Mr. Mendoza's 
car during the chase, defendant attempted to flee on foot. Officers apprehended 
defendant a short distance later (R60:7). 
Defendant was in possession of Mr. Mendoza's wallet when he was apprehended. 
The gun he had used to confront Mr. Mendoza was found in a garbage can at a nearby 
residence (R60:7). 
On October 15, 2004, based on the foregoing facts, defendant was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, and possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person, a second degree felony (Rl-2). Defendant was assigned a public defender the 
same day (R9-10). 
On January 27, 2005, defendant entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery in 
exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the firearm charge and to not refer that 
charge to federal prosecutors (R23, 26-30). During the plea colloquy, the trial court 
asked defendant whether he was satisfied with his legal representation; defendant 
responded that he was (R60:3). The trial court then discussed with defendant the right to 
a jury trial that defendant would be waiving if he entered the plea. The court explained 
that defendant did not have to enter a guilty plea and that he would be given sufficient 
time to prepare for trial if defendant decided not to enter a guilty plea. Defendant 
indicated that he understood (R60:4). Upon further questioning, defendant also 
confirmed that he understood the other constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a 
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guilty plea (R60:5). Defendant's written statement in support of his plea also showed an 
understanding of the constitutional rights he was waiving (R26-31). 
On February 15, 2005, before sentencing, defendant sent a pro se letter to the trial 
court indicating that he wanted to withdraw his plea (R32). Defendant explained: 
I know I said I understood everything that was going on, but since 
court I've been talking to people around me including the contract 
lawyer here in Draper prison and have come to re[a]lize that I should 
not have taken the five to life. The only reason I did is because my 
lawyer said if I was found guilty on both charges by a jury I would 
have to do the five to life first and then the one to fifteen. I don't 
feel that my lawyer p[er]formed to the best of his ability for me. I 
believe strongly that I was rushed through this whole matter and 
would like to withdraw my plea. 
(R32). 
On March 9, 2005, defendant's counsel filed a formal motion to withdraw 
defendant's plea, alleging that "defendant feels that his attorney did not perform to the 
best of his abilities and that the defendant feels that he was rushed through the whole 
matter." Although the motion indicated that it was "based upon Defendant's 
Memorandum to be submitted," neither defendant nor counsel ever filed any supporting 
memorandum (R33). 
On March 11, 2005, the State filed a response opposing defendant's motion (R35). 
On March 17, 2005, the trial court invited argument on defendant's withdrawal 
motion (R59). At that time, defense counsel confirmed that defendant "still wishes to 
withdraw his plea." However, when asked whether he wished to "make any further 
argument than that's been submitted," counsel responded, "I don't." Neither defendant 
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nor his counsel requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion or appointment of new 
counsel to present it (R59:2). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion: 
Based upon the submissions that I have, the Court has looked 
at the process by which this was brought by [sic] before the Court, 
Mr. Person. It is not sufficient to claim that your attorney did not 
perform to the best of his abilities and you felt rushed. You and I 
had a discussion about this case, I went through what your rights 
were in great detail and we talked about that[,] over and over talked 
about it. And in addition to that, there were things placed in writing 
and I find that there are no grounds sufficient for me to grant the 
motion, and therefore, I deny the motion to set aside your plea. 
(R59:2-3). The court then sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life in the Utah 
State Prison, to run consecutive to any term defendant was already serving (R59:3-4). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his plea withdrawal 
motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing and appointing new counsel. 
However, because defendant did not preserve these claims below and does not argue plain 
error on appeal, this Court should not reach them. This Court should also reject 
defendant's claims because he invited any error when, upon questioning by the court, 
defendant not only did not request a hearing or new counsel but, rather, affirmatively 
indicated that the matter was ready for submission. 
In any case, the trial court did not commit obvious or prejudicial error in denying 
defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing. First, defendant never requested such 
a hearing and the record otherwise did not support his motion. Thus, no obvious error 
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occurred in denying the motion. Second, defendant provides no record of what evidence 
he would have presented had an evidentiary hearing been held. Thus, defendant has not 
established that he was prejudiced by the lack of a hearing. 
Finally, the trial court also did not commit plain error in denying defendant's 
motion without first appointing new counsel. Even assuming the court committed 
obvious error in not appointing new counsel, defendant has not shown he was prejudiced 
by that error where he provides no record of what new counsel would have done 
differently to make a more favorable result reasonably likely. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
when counsel did not ask for conflict counsel or present any evidence or argument in 
support of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant's claims fail because he 
nowhere identifies what conflict counsel would have done differently or what evidence or 
argument should have been presented. Thus, defendant has not shown that he was 
adversely affected or otherwise prejudiced by trial counsel's performance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR 
APPOINTING NEW COUNSEL WHERE NOTHING IN THE 
RECORD SUGGESTS THAT A MORE FAVORABLE RESULT 
WAS REASONABLY LIKELY HAD THE COURT TAKEN SUCH 
ACTION 
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without appointing new counsel and 
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without granting him a hearing." Aplt. Br. at 10 (capitalization omitted). Defendant's 
unpreserved claims fail because he cannot demonstrate plain error. 
A. Because defendant does not argue plain error on appeal, this 
Court should not reach his unpreserved claims. 
Because defendant did not preserve his claims below, this Court may reach them 
only if defendant argues plain error. Defendant has not argued plain error. Thus, this 
Court should not reach his claims. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "4a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s].'" State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see 
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This rule "applies to every claim 
. . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain 
error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ [ 11; see also State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 
Tf 41, 63 P.3d 731 ("We have often stated that issues not raised at trial cannot be argued 
for the first time on appeal. . . unless the petitioner demonstrates that "plain error" 
occurred or "exceptional circumstances" exist.") (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). This Court has often declined to review unpreserved claims, where defendant 
does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) ("Because Pledger does not argue that 'exceptional 
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, we decline to consider it on 
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appeal."); State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 35 n.5, 27 P.3d 1115; State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). 
In this case, defendant did not ask the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on his 
withdrawal motion, nor did he ask the court to appoint new counsel to argue his motion. 
Consequently, defendant's claims are unpreserved, and this Court may reach them only if 
defendant argues plain error. See, e.g., Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ j 41; Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
If 11. Defendant has not argued plain error here. See Aplt. Br. at 10-15. Thus, this Court 
should not reach defendant's claims. See Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 35 n.5; Pledger, 896 P.2d 
at 1229 n.5; Brown, 856 P.2d at 359. 
B. Defendant's claims fail because they were invited. 
Even if this Court overlooked defendant's failure to preserve his claims below, his 
claims would nonetheless fail under the invited error doctrine. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that '"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
[defendant].'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 16, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993)). However, "while [this Court may] review 
issues . . . for plain error, [it] will not save a party from error when that party 'has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error.'" State v. 
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ^ j 41, 63 P.3d 731 (refusing to reach invited error even in capital 
case) (quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)). Thus, if defendant has 
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"'affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong'" with the 
manner in which matters were proceeding, the appellate court will not consider any claim 
of error on appeal. State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,1f 25, 63 P.3d 110 (quoting State 
v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)) (additional citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). In other words, if the trial court "gave defendant ample opportunity to 
object.. . , and he failed to do so," this Court will not save defendant from any alleged 
error that occurred. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. 
The invited error doctrine applies here. First, neither defendant nor his counsel, in 
their written motions to the trial court, requested either an evidentiary hearing or the 
appointment of new counsel (R32,33). Second and more importantly, neither defendant 
nor his counsel made such a request at the subsequent hearing held on defendant's 
motion, despite having the opportunity to do so. At that hearing, the trial court 
specifically asked defense counsel whether he had anything further he wished to present 
concerning defendant's motion. Defense counsel responded that he did not (R59:2). 
Then, despite an apparent comfort with addressing the court on his own, defendant 
remained silent (R32 (filing pro se withdrawal motion); R59:2). 
On this record, "the trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to [present 
evidence and additional argument on his withdrawal motion] . . . , and he failed to do so." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. To the contrary, defendant "affirmatively led the trial court 
to believe that there was nothing wrong" with the court ruling on defendant's motion 
without further proceedings. As a consequence, defendant cannot now complain that no 
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further proceedings were held. See Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, Tf 41; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 
1109; Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3,1j 25. 
C. The trial court did not commit plain error in denying 
defendant's motion without an evidentiary hearing where no 
hearing was requested and the record consequently lacked any 
evidence supporting defendant's contentions. 
Even if this Court reaches the merits of defendant's evidentiary claim, the claim 
fails because defendant has not established that the trial court committed obvious or 
prejudicial error. 
Section 77-13-6(2)(a) of the Utah Code provides that "[a] plea of guilty . . . may be 
withdrawn only upon . . . a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004). A defendant can make such a showing 
only "by putting forth evidence that the plea was in fact involuntary." State v. Humphrey, 
2003 UT App 333, *{ 10, 79 P.3d 960 (emphasis added). 
Here, defendant never asked the trial court to present evidence in support of his 
withdrawal motion. Consequently, defendant presented no evidence supporting his 
claims that counsel had misrepresented the potential sentences he would face absent the 
plea bargain, that counsel did not perform "to the best of his ability for me," and that 
defendant "was rushed through this whole matter" (R32). Indeed, as the trial judge 
pointed out, he had gone "through what [defendant's] rights were in great detail and we 
talked about that[,] over and over talked about it" (R59:2-3). 
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Absent any evidence to the contrary, the trial court had no basis upon which to 
conclude that defendant's plea was unknowing or involuntary. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(2)(a). Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, in denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw that plea. See State v. Pooler, 2002 UT App 299,17, 56 
P.3d 979 (holding that, where "[defendant did not present or proffer any evidence [to the 
trial court] specifying the irregularities that he now claims," the trial court did not err in 
presuming that the prior proceedings were proper); State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 987 
(Utah App. 1995) (holding that, where "[i]t was . . . defendant's responsibility to present 
evidence [on the matter at issue and] [defendant failed to do so," trial court could 
properly decide issue based on existing record). Cf. Billings v. State, 738 P.2d 554, 555 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (memorandum opinion) (upholding trial court's denial of 
defendant's plea withdrawal motion where "[t]he motion did not request an evidentiary 
hearing, petitioner presented no evidence in support of the motion, and no evidentiary 
hearing on the motion was ever held").2 
2In support of his claim that the trial court erred in deciding his motion without an 
evidentiary hearing, defendant cites to Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343-45 (Utah 
App. 1988). See Aplt. Br. at 9, 14. Summers, however, was a post-conviction case, see 
Summers, 759 P.2d at 343-44, which is governed by specific procedural rules, see Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -304 (West 2004); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Defendant's case 
involves a motion to withdraw, not a post-conviction petition. Thus, the post-conviction 
rules did not apply here. Moreover, although Summers finds error in the trial court's 
dismissal of the petition without an evidentiary hearing, it is unclear in that decision 
whether the petitioner had requested such a hearing. 
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Finally, even if defendant could show obvious error, his claim nonetheless fails 
because defendant cannot show prejudice where nothing in the record indicates what 
evidence, if any, defendant would have presented at an evidentiary hearing. Cf. State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Utah 1998) (stating, in ineffective assistance context, that 
prejudice "must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter") (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) 
(stating, in ineffective assistance context, that an "invitation to speculate cannot substitute 
for proof of prejudice"). 
Consequently, defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error in 
denying his motion to withdraw without first holding an evidentiary hearing fails. 
D. The trial court did not commit plain error in denying 
defendant's withdrawal motion without first appointing new 
counsel where defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced 
by the lack of new counsel. 
Finally, even if this Court reaches defendant's claim that the trial court should 
have appointed new counsel before deciding his withdrawal motion, defendant's claim 
fails because he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the trial court's alleged error. 
"The right to conflict-free representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." 
State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, % 22, 984 P.2d 382. However, "to show this right was 
violated, [a defendant] must establish both that [his counsel] had an actual conflict of 
interest, and that the conflict adversely affected [counsel's] performance." Id. 
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"To establish an actual conflict of interest, defendants must show, as a threshold 
matter, that trial counsel 'was required to make a choice advancing his own interests to 
the detriment of his client's interests.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah App. 
1998) (quoting State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997)) (additional internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Even then, however, if "there is no indication 
tha t . . . had counsel been substituted, the outcome would have been any better for 
[defendant]," defendant's conflict of interest claim fails. Lovell, 1999 UT 40,135. 
In this case, defendant has presented no evidence supporting his original 
claim—made in his plea withdrawal motion—that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance in advising him concerning his guilty plea. Specifically, defendant did not 
request an evidentiary hearing below, nor did he move this Court to remand the matter for 
an evidentiary hearing under rule 23B, of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See 
Utah R. App. P. 23B (providing that appellate courts may remand matter to trial court for 
evidentiary hearing if defendant presents "nonspeculative allegation^] of facts, not fully 
appearing in the record on appeal," which, if true, support a determination that trial 
counsel was ineffective). 
The necessary conclusion must be that no facts exist to support defendant's 
original counsel ineffectiveness claim. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 16-17, 12 
P.3d 92 (holding that, if defendant is aware of any non-record facts supporting his claim 
of counsel's ineffectiveness, "defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of 
moving for a temporary remand"; noting that "[t]he necessary consequence of this burden 
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is that an appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it 
is supported by all the relevant evidence of which defendant is aware"). 
Absent such evidence, defendant's plain error claim that the trial court should have 
appointed new counsel to argue the motion fails. 
First, nothing in Utah law requires a trial court to automatically disqualify trial 
counsel every time a defendant advances an unsupported, self-serving claim of counsel's 
ineffectiveness. Thus, the trial court did not err, let alone obviously err, in failing to sua 
sponte disqualify defendant's counsel before denying defendant's withdrawal motion 
here. 
Second, even if defendant could show obvious error in the trial court's failure to 
sua sponte appoint new counsel, defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by the 
error. Specifically, defendant has not identified anything that new counsel would have 
done in support of defendant's withdrawal motion that defendant's trial counsel did not 
do. See Aplt. Br. at 10-15. Thus, defendant has not shown that, "absent the [trial court's 
alleged] error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
[defendant]'" on his withdrawal motion. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, \ 16 (citation 
omitted). 
Defendant's plain error claim therefore fails.3 
3Even if this Court were to find that the trial court committed plain error in 
denying defendant's motion without first having an evidentiary hearing or appointing new 
counsel, the remedy is not to vacate defendant's guilty plea, but rather to remand the 
matter back to the trial court for appointment of new counsel and reconsideration of 
defendant's withdrawal motion. 
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II. DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL 
WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT REQUESTING AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING OR NEW COUNSEL AFTER DEFENDANT FILED A 
WITHDRAWAL MOTION WHERE DEFENDANT HAS NOT 
IDENTIFIED ANYTHING NEW COUNSEL WOULD HAVE DONE 
DIFFERENTLY 
Defendant alternatively claims that he "received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his attorney didn't ask for conflict counsel to be appointed and when he didn't 
present any evidence or argument on defendant's behalf." Aplt. Br. at 15 (capitalization 
omitted). Because nothing in the record indicates that defendant was adversely affected 
by his counsel's performance, defendant's claim fails. 
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show 
both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see 
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
"However, when an ineffectiveness claim is grounded on a conflict of interest, 
[this Court] presumes prejudice if the defendant demonstrates 'that an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 85 
(Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted); see also State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 22, 984 P.2d 
382. If "there is no indication tha t . . . had counsel been substituted, the outcome would 
have been any better for [defendant]," defendant has not shown that the alleged conflict 
adversely affected him. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, ^ 35. 
16 
Under either test, "defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 16, 12 P.3d 92 ("If a defendant is aware of any 
'nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if 
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective,' Utah R. App. P. 23B, 
defendant bears the primary obligation and burden of moving for a temporary remand."). 
"The necessary consequence of this burden is that an appellate court will presume that 
any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence 
of which defendant is aware." Id. at f^ 17. 
In this case, defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel 
"didn't present any evidence or argument on . . . behalf of defendant's motion to 
withdraw his plea. Aplt. Br. at 15. However, as already discussed, defendant nowhere 
identifies what evidence or argument counsel should have but did not present. 
Consequently, defendant has not shown either that his counsel performed deficiently in 
not presenting such evidence or argument, or that defendant was prejudiced by such 
performance. 
Similarly, although defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective because 
counsel "didn't ask for conflict counsel to be appointed," Aplt. Br. at 15, defendant 
presents no evidence establishing that an actual conflict existed when trial counsel 
presented defendant's withdrawal motion or that, " had counsel been substituted, the 
outcome would have been any better for [defendant]." Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f^ 35. 
17 
Thus, as with his plain error claims, defendant's ineffective assistance claims fail 
because nothing in the record supports them. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED JX_ December 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah/Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNjK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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